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Although market is busy today working on the bullet LCDS contract to remove the cancellation feature from syndi-
cated secured loan derivatives, in their current form LCDSs and LCDX tranches are still exposed to the cancellation
risk. Until recently, in lack of proper modelling framework, market practitioners neglected the cancellation risk and
they priced and hedged these products as simple CDSs and CDO tranches. However, cancellation risk does matter!
Especially in the current market situation. As we show here, it is more than important to take into account the
cancellation risk while marking-to-market and hedging syndicated secured loan derivatives. For this purpose, we
present here an easy and robust way to model the cancellation. n
1 Introduction
After months of discussions, by September 2008 the dealer
group has drafted a new bullet form of LCDS contracts and
submitted it to ISDA for approval. This new form removes the
cancellation language, so the contract stays in place even if all
of the bank debt goes away. From this new contract they ex-
pect the increase of liquidity on the market, since they focused
on removing the cancellation feature that makes pricing di-
cult and idiosyncratic and has contributed to illiquidity in the
market for the derivative. Removing the cancellation option
should have the eect of standardizing unwinds and, as a re-
sult, valuation.
However, not everybody has welcomed the new contract.
Portfolio managers that manage loan risk prefer the old con-
tract, because in case the underlying loan went away, the LCDS
on the loan would also go away. Furthermore, some traders
worry about, that even if the LCDS is not cancelled, the can-
cellation of the underlying loan may have a gamma eect and
the volatility of basket expected loss may change too. There-
fore, some risks related to cancellation will still remain. An
other aspect is what will happen with the existing old con-
tracts. Even introducing the new bullet LCDS contract, the
rolling of liquid names from old to new contracts will depend
on the value of cancellation option and it is even not clear how
long the rolling may last.
In September 2008, market players hoped to have the bul-
let contract put in place before the New Year, but still there is
no time for the launch, which is deﬁnitively not in sight at the
moment. However, institutional investors and portfolio man-
agers do have LCDSs and LCDX tranches in their books that
should be revaluated and hedged on a day-to-day basis. In this
paper, focusing on the old contract we give simple and robust
techniques to take cancellation risk into account.
2 Modelling the LCDS spreads
At ﬁrst, we need to identify trigger events (like default, can-
cellation or restructuring) that can change the corporate sta-
tus (like defaulted, cancelled or survived). The corporate sta-
tus is modelled by a continuous time Markov chain, where the
change of the status is deﬁned by the default and prepayment
intensities (correspondingly d(t) and p(t)). This speciﬁes a
common reduced-form model for credits. It follows that
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By construction the sum of these three probabilities is
equal to one for each maturity. The parameter a is used to
model the eciency of substitution. Let us say, for a current
non-cancellable contract in case of prepayment a substituter
loan is found with 90% probability, thus a = 0:1 showing that
the contract is less exposed to cancellation risk than a can-
cellable counterpart. This implies, that for the same issuer,
same seniority and restructuring clause the above conditional
default probabilities are implicitly higher for non-cancellable
LCDS contracts than for cancellable LCDS contracts. This
happens, because the cancellation risk amortizes both the de-
fault and survival probabilities.
13 Moments and the role of cancellation
Until now we made no restrictions on the introduced reduced-
form model. The underlying intensity processes can be deter-
ministic or stochastic, there can be jumps or no jumps, the
intensities can be correlated or not. However, all these factors
have impact more on the higher order moments of the cumu-
lated intensities. Therefore, the proper choice of the intensity
processes may be important to price LCDS options and other
sophisticated products, but calculating only the above proba-
bilities and fair spreads of LCDSs, it is the ﬁrst moment that
matters. As investigated in [6], this is also the reason why nei-
ther the correlated default and prepayment intensities nor the
correlated stochastic recoveries can explain the joint puzzle of
CDS and LCDS spreads.
ConsideringthepricingofLCDSs, thecancellationriskhas
double eect. The cancellation probability is amortizing both
the default leg and the fee leg of an LCDS. Therefore, as de-
tailed in [6], the impact of the cancellation probability on the
fair spread is not signiﬁcant. This explains why – in spite of
some market beliefs – implied prepayment probabilities can
hardly be derived solely from CDS and LCDS spreads. How-
ever, the cancellation probability indeed plays an important
role in marking-to-market and managing the risks of an out-
standing LCDS position. Due to possible cancellation the risky
annuity of the LCDS as a measure for the expected maturity is
deﬁnitively lower than it would be when disallowing cancel-
lation.
The price of LCDX tranches just like the price of classi-
cal CDO tranches are more ﬁrst moment derivatives and they
are less exposed to single name risks like stochastic volatility
of fair spreads or jumps in the intensity processes. Therefore,
seeking for ecient hedging and marking-to-market of LCDS
tranches implies less focus on the processes of the underlying
intensities and implies more need to focus on the robust esti-
mation of prepayment probabilities. To price LCDX tranches
we may consider to use even a simplistic LCDS model with de-
terministic default and prepayment intensities. We can do so,
because, as we show later, the only information we need from
the single name LCDS model are the conditional probabilities
deﬁned above and some further recovery assumptions.
Concerning the calibration to single names, once we have
assumptions about the prepayment intensities, we bootstrap
the default intensities from LCDS spreads as it is usually done
when dealing with simple CDSs. Since we are not able to
get implied cancellation rates from LCDS quotes, working
with large homogeneous portfolio models we will assume a
constant cancellation rate being homogeneous for each single
name contract in the portfolio.
4 Extended base correlation models
Although base correlation models for CDOs as introduced in
[9] are often criticized, with their extensions like Lévy cop-
ulas ([1], [4], [8]) and stochastic recovery ([2]) they are still
in use on the market because of their simplicity and practi-
cality. These models are deﬁnitively not reliable to price for-
ward CDOs or index options, but they are robust enough for
marking-to-marketandhedgingCDOtranches. Untilrecently,
the base correlation models exhibited the default and stochas-
tic recovery features, but not the cancellation one. However, as
we show here, these one-factor models can be easily extended
to incorporate cancellation.
In the one-factor models the common factor y plays the
role of the market. In our extended model we assume that
when the factor is high, the conditional cancellation probabil-
ities q(y;t) that are high, when it is low, the conditional default
probabilities p(y;t) that are high. This seems to be a realistic
assumption. In downturn the companies are more likely to
default, while in good health the companies are more likely to
repay their loans and apply for new ones but with lower rates.
On the following ﬁgure we present how the default and
cancellation time distributions are correlated. Based on the
Gaussian copula with correlation 30% and assuming that the
issuers have the same default and cancellation probabilities
– thus they have the same default and cancellation barriers, –
we show ﬁve loan value realizations. In the simulated scenario
loan III prepays before T = 5, loan IV defaults before T = 5 and
all the others run until maturity T = 5.
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Horizontal lines are dierent loans, A (cancellation barrier), B (default
barrier), C (default time of loan IV), D (cancellation time of loan III)
Unfortunately, in this one-factor model the Gaussian copula
correlates the default time distributions and the cancellation
time distributions equally. However, one may argue that in
downturn the correlation between defaults are usually higher
than the correlation between cancellations in upturn. There-
fore, it may be reasonable to use a skewed Lévy copula like
the -stable copula, which allows dierent correlations on the
tails of the common factor’s distribution. Using such a copula,
we may approach theArmageddon scenario on the default tail,
while not allowing cancellations in large number on the other
tail. Thanks to this trick, while being intuitive the model re-
mains tractable with only a few parameters (the -stable cop-
ula has only one parameter more than the Gaussian copula).
Alpha-Stable Copula ( = 1:5, corr = 75%)
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2Concerning the correlation between defaults and prepay-
ments, in line with our intuition, it is negative. However,
– though one may think – the one-factor model does not
mean perfect negative correlation between defaults and pre-
payments. Let us consider a scenario, where the simulated
market factor y is very low. In this case the default probabili-
ties conditional on the market state pi (y;t) are very high. But,
the default of the best issuer in a scenario does not mean that
all the others will default too. Although the likelihood is very
low, mathematically the probability is still there that the worst
issuer will repay its loan (or merge with an other company that
is triggered as cancellation too).
Now, considering the mathematical formulation of the
proposed model, the major dierence compared to well-
known one-factor models is that we allow the possibility of
cancellation too. In order to obtain the conditional loss distri-
bution function 
y
k;l (t), we apply a recursive formula as in [3],
but we extend it with the conditional cancellation probabili-
ties qi (y;t). We mark the extension with colours.
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Due to the extension the recursive formula will not produce
here a vector, but a triangular matrix. The elements of the ma-
trix will tell us what the probability of scenarios are where k
companies go to default and l companies repay its loan trig-
gering a cancellation of the LCDS. The matrix is triangular,
because a scenario where the number of defaults added to the
number of cancellations is higher than the number of issuers
is impossible.
The joint conditional density and marginal distributions
are calculated as usual. In order to price the credit leg of a
tranche, we need to calculate the expected loss on the tranche,
while to revalue the fee leg of the tranche, we have to calcu-
late the expected notional of the tranche. The dierence com-
pared to common one-factor models as those in [1] is that the
notional may be decreased not only by defaults, but also by
cancellations that from pricing point of view are considered
as defaults with recovery of 100%. For the whole portfolio
the expected loss E[L(t)] and the expected notional decrease
E[N (t)] are calculated as follows.
E[L(t)] =
Z
y
0
B B B B B B @

1  ¯ R(y)


m X
k=1
k
m
m k X
l=0

y
k;l (t)
1
C C C C C C AdH(y)
E[N (t)] =
Z
y
0
B B B B B B @
m X
l=1
l
m
m l X
k=0

y
k;l (t)+
m X
k=1
k
m
m k X
l=0

y
k;l (t)
1
C C C C C C AdH(y)
where H(y) is the distribution function of the common factor
y. A more detailed description of the mathematical formula-
tion can be found in [7]. Concerning the recovery rates R(y) in
the expected loss formula, as introduced in [2] we assume that
they are deterministic functions of the copula factor y. In this
manner, the recovery rates are stochastic and correlated with
the market factor. Concerning loan-only credit indices, the ex-
tension of the one-factor model with stochastic recovery is not
only intuitive, but it is required in all cases to be able to match
the tranche quotes. Otherwise, the base correlations would hit
the barrier of 100%.
5 How do we calibrate the cancellation rate?
The remaining question before we can use our extended base
correlationmodelishowwecancalibratethecancellationrate.
The spread of the super senior tranche is a redundant param-
eter in the base correlation model. Normally, the CDO like
models fail to match the market quotes for the LCDX super
senior tranche. This already suggests that some important
factors like the cancellation are deﬁnitively missing from the
pure CDO models. Using the LCDX super senior quotes to
ﬁnd implied cancellation rates, the analysis for the last roll of
LCDXfollows. Theconﬁgurationis: -stableLévycopulawith
characteristic 1.9 and stochastic recovery with market correla-
tion of 90%.
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BC1 to BC4 note the base correlations related to the ﬁrst four
tranches of LCDX. For comparison, we present also the cali-
bration of a pure CDO model. The conﬁguration for the com-
parison is: Gaussian copula and stochastic recovery with mar-
ket correlation of 90%, but without the cancellation feature.
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Comparing the two ﬁgures we may conclude that includ-
ing cancellation into the one-factor model, the base correlation
curve is ﬂatter and more stable in time. In both cases for some
3days we may recognise base correlation smiles instead of base
correlation skew. Although it may be unusual – also for tradi-
tional CDOs the smile has appeared only recently, – the smile
causes no pricing problem as long as the base correlation curve
is close to be ﬂat like in this case.
Furthermore, one may argue that these implied cancella-
tion rates do not meet some expectations. Obviously, an expert
may have his own cancellation rate that may periodically de-
viate from the cancellation rates implied by this model. The
implied cancellation rate is an indication that assures a ﬁt to
the super senior tranche spread too, but beside that one may
calculate risky annuities and deltas with other rates too. It
does not limit the application of the model. For comparison,
we show below how the one-factor model without cancellation
can ﬁt the super senior tranche quotes. The conﬁguration is as
earlier: Gaussian copula and stochastic recovery with market
correlation of 90%.
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6 Marking-to-market
The daily revaluation and unwind of single name, index and
tranche positions require the estimation of the so-called risky
annuity. Opposite to the delta, the risky annuity is not di-
rectly observable on the market. Therefore, the daily reval-
uation and possible unwind may be cumbersome. After we
deﬁned the mathematical formulation for the expect loss and
expected notional decrease, even with the extension to cancel-
lation the calculation of risky annuities for tranches remains
the same job as for the common one-factor models.
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As explained earlier, the cancellation decreases the risky
annuities. In this manner, the cancellation assumption has a
signiﬁcant eect on the MtM of outstanding positions. Look-
ing at the risky annuities calculated for the LCDX, which are
also the weighted sum of the tranches’ risky annuities, we may
conclude that in some cases disregarding from cancellation
may cause a dierence in MtM of 47%!
7 Hedging
In case of credit derivatives it is quite dicult to prove that
a model implies proper hedging ratios. Therefore, this kind
of hedge tests are usually missing from articles in the litera-
ture. Nevertheless, in this section we compare the hedging
performance of the one-factor model with and without cancel-
lation. Obviously, if we would test the two versions separately,
we would not see much dierences in hedging performance,
because the deltas and risky annuities of the same model are
always consistent with each other. We see dierence only if
we evaluate the delta of one model with the risky annuity as
measure of the other model.
Since our main hypothesis is that cancellation should be
taken into account, we use the risky annuities from the model
with cancellation to measure the daily PnLs and we test how
the deltas produced by the two dierent models (with and
without cancellations) perform comparing to each other. For
this purpose, we apply the following strategy every day in the
service of the hedge test.
Day 0: Sell protection via LCDX tranche, notional of 1M
USD (receive upfront and spread)
Buy protection via the index, notional given by the
hedge ratio, delta (pay spread)
Day 1: Close the positions
As a measure for comparison, we computed the standard
deviation of the daily PnLs. Although a pure index hedge
against tranches is never satisfactory – hedge by constituents
are deﬁnitively more ecient, – in line with our expectations
we concluded that the model with implied cancellation rate
performs better than the model without cancellation. The dif-
ference between the two ways of hedging is not enormous, but
consistent and shows that cancellation risk does matter! This
analysis considered only the simple index hedge, but carrying
out the hedge by single names, the impact would be more pro-
nounced.
Standard deviations of the daily PnL using index hedge
0%-5% 5%-8% 8%-12% 12%-15% 15%-
NoCanc 6,179$ 12,229$ 21,405$ 17,269$ 7,910$
ImpCanc 6,181$ 12,103$ 21,090$ 16,914$ 6,687$
The dierence is most obvious when we look at the su-
per senior tranche, which is the tranche most exposed to the
cancellation risk. Analysing this tranche, we found that apply-
ing the model with implied cancellation the distribution of the
daily PnLs has smaller standard deviation and the distribution
is less skewed than it would be disallowing cancellation.
An important aspect is how the cancellation risk can be
hedged. Based on [6], the cancellation rate has no signiﬁcant
impact on LCDS spreads. Therefore, it has no impact on the
LCDX index spread neither. In this manner, the cancellation
risk of LCDX tranches cannot be hedged by the index or by
constituents. Only the default risk can be hedged by them.
48 Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a simple and robust way to han-
dle the cancellation feature, which is present in the LCDS and
LCDX tranche contracts. Analysing pricing and risk managing
perspectives we showed that taking into account the cancel-
lation risk while marking-to-market and hedging syndicated
secured loan derivatives is more than important. Therefore,
institutional investors and portfolio managers keeping LCDSs
and LCDX tranches in their books should consider the reval-
uation and hedge of those products by incorporating also the
cancellation into their modelling framework.
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